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. Whether or not the operation was a "success," is largely irrelevant. What is important are the lessons that we are reminded of -not least of which is the difficulty in trying to divine strategic direction from a coalition composed of nations with divergent interests. History is ripe with examples of the importance of strategic direction driving commander's intent in operations. Certainly, the strange marriage of communists, colonialists, and capitalists formalized by the grand alliance between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States during World War II is a colorful backdrop to frame the discussion. While all three were committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, the campaign in the Mediterranean is an example of the danger of competing and divergent national interests. In particular, the tragedy at Anzio exemplified the implications of a lack of solidarity in strategic direction driving operational and tactical blunders on the battlefield. Significantly, recent operations in December 1943, Lucas and his VI Corp were directed to:
1. Seize and secure the beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio.
2. Advance and secure the Colli Laziali (Alban Hills).
3. Be prepared to advance on Rome. Clark and Lucas' main concern was that the plan was under-resourced, a vulnerability easily exploited by experienced German troops. A note dictated for General Clark well illustrates his dilemma:
…genuinely eager to engage in Shingle, to the point of committing in it units which he would subsequently have to utilize in ANVIL, but that, in effect, a pistol was being held at his head because he was told, totally to his surprise, that if he was to engage in SHINGLE it must be done with inadequate landing craft, that the craft would be available for only two days after the landing, and that no supply or reinforcement thereafter would be available. In effect, therefore, he was asked to land two divisions at a point where a juncture with the balance of the Fifth Army was impossible for a long period, thereby leaving two divisions in question out on a very long limb. Rapid execution and poor German intelligence allowed the VI Corps to completely surprise Kesselring's forces and secure the beachhead with only 13 killed and 97 wounded. 26 An Irish coalition soldier characterized the landings as "very gentlemanly, calm and dignified." 27 This speed was critical in maintaining operational security. Despite a short planning timeline, poor German intelligence also assisted in maintaining the element of surprise. Over 60 tank landing crafts (LST's), 300 landing craft, ships, destroyers, and cruisers were positioned and prepared. Amazingly, The Allies on the beachhead on the first day of the landing did not conform to the German High Command's expectations. Instead of moving northward with the first wave to seize the Alban Mountains…the landing forces limited their objective. Their initial action was to occupy a small beachhead…As the Allies made no preparations for a large-scale attack on the first day of the landings, the German Command estimated that the Allies would improve their positions, and bring up more troops…During this time sufficient German troops would arrive to prevent an Allied breakthrough.
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German troops arrived in sufficient strength and speed to prevent the surprise landings at Anzio from yielding the operational advantage and strategic effect. Under
Operation "Case Richard," the Germans reinforced the area with infantry, jaeger and panzer divisions. By 24 January, while General Lucas consolidated his forces around the initial landings, more than 40,000 German soldiers closed on the area. By 29
January, German reinforcements rose to nearly 70,000 soldiers from eight different divisions that established key blocking positions against the Allied positions (see Figure 2 ). "Moreover, a new threat soon emerged in the form of deadly radio-controlled glide bombs, which forced the Naval support to retire at 1600 hours each day." 30 The Swearing to hunt his own citizens down like "rats," and authorizing attacks on innocent people, hospitals, and ambulances, Qadhafi gave every indication that he would do whatever was necessary to maintain power. 33 Using the protection of innocents as justification for intervention, a diverse coalition of nations came together to stop Qadhafi's aggression. The United States and NATO led this band.
In the 2010 National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama identifies four overarching national interests: security, prosperity, values, and international order. 34 With respect to international order, he states that it should be an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. At face value, it seems that supporting NATO operations in Libya served the larger strategic direction of promoting United
States values and advancing international order. Moreover, the President clearly asserted that the United States relationship with NATO is the cornerstone of our engagement throughout the world. He describes the alliance as the pre-eminent security alliance in the world with the stated goal of strengthening the collective ability to promote security, deter vital threats, and defend member citizens. In the case of Libya, the coalescing end state for the coalition of the willing was the protection of civilians. In his address to the American people, President Obama stated that NATO had a responsibility to act to protect the innocent civilians, and if the members waited just one more day, "Benghazi, a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world." 38 In reality, several members of NATO had many other motivations to ensure regional stability, most of which were political and economic, not humanitarian. 42 It is also suggested that President Sarkozy was politically motivated towards intervention to distract voters from economic woes and corruption in his own party. 43 The at Anzio was costly in time, blood, and treasure. In Libya, operations were not as complicated, and the enemy was less capable and more predictable. However, identifying a strategic end state that satisfied the real interests of all coalition nations, and then designing an operation that achieved the end-state was problematic at best. In both cases, Coalition Force Commanders had to balance national interests and caveats to generate operational success on the battlefield. Whether it was landing craft extensions at Anzio or putting NATO special operations forces on the ground in Libya, commanders worked and adapted inside their multi-national frameworks.
NATO is a political and a military alliance based on the
Operation SHINGLE is an excellent case study on why understanding strategic direction is essential for unified action during war. The stated object of the operation was to facilitate the breakout of the Allies behind the Gustav line and capture Romethereby drawing German reinforcements from other fronts. 51 At the operational level, The Germans viewed the Anzio beach landing as a success for the Allies, followed by an immediate failure to move quickly and capitalize on the initiative.
Certainly, the failure at Anzio is a result of many factors. Faulty assumptions by the planning staff on enemy capability, inadequate resources for the invasion force, hesitant leadership at the most senior task force levels, and an overall lack of agility by coalition forces were contributing factors. Unfortunately, war is a human endeavor characterized by uncertainty, and history is full of examples that illustrate the necessity for clarity in strategic direction. Clear strategic direction provides focus and purpose to subordinate leaders. At Anzio, this strategic direction was lost between the architects and the executors of the plan. In the final analysis of Anzio, many are quick to cite an apparent lack of aggressiveness in General Lucas. With the benefit of hindsight, the Mediterranean strategy at Anzio was under resourced from the beginning and not executable in a manner that could achieve the desired objective of cutting German lines of communication and forcing a retreat. General Clark knew it, and that is why he modified his orders to General Lucas. In a telling exchange just after the landings, General Clark offered this advice to General Lucas: "Don't stick your neck out, Johnny. I did at Salerno and got into trouble." 53 Therefore, the American commanders did the best they could, balancing means with ends and taking risk where they thought appropriate.
No one was more disappointed, except perhaps Churchill himself, in the apparent lack of understanding of Mediterranean strategic direction than Chief of the Imperial Staff, Field Marshal Alan Brooke:
American drag on us has seriously affected our Mediterranean strategy and the whole conduct of this war. If they had come wholeheartedly into the Mediterranean with us, we should by now have Rome securely, [and] the Balkans would be ablaze. I blame myself for having the vision to foresee these possibilities and yet have failed to overcome the American shortsighted views, and to have allowed my better judgment to be affected by them 54 Unfortunately at Anzio, orders were not given that would achieve the strategic effect, and too much blood and time were wasted salvaging an operation ultimately derailed by divergent coalition interests and differing priorities.
Libya demonstrated that although coalitions of the willing may have divergent interests, it is still possible to achieve your common objectives, even if it appears haphazard. Regardless of the overriding national interests, finding common ground is critical in providing the strategic direction necessary to design and conduct operations. Libya from their own government, one wonders how this is possible without regime change or ground forces advising the Libyan rebels. The fact that ground advisors were introduced and regime change occurred is a pleasant fact for the coalition, because it was never identified in the strategic objectives of the campaign, nor was it authorized in the UNSCR. That European economic interests were also secured by this operation is also too convenient to be ignored. Some say that all is well that ends well, except this is problematic in light of the human tragedy now occurring in Syria. Thousands have died and many wonder why the Libyan people were more important for the NATO and coalition members to protect. The hard truth is that we risk alliance credibility by trying to work a slight of hand in foreign policy. All this is to say that the one chosen to lead the coalition needs to have some situational and political awareness. The Coalition Force Commander must make sure that commander's intent reflects the strategic direction in tactical operations in order to generate unity of effort.
The man in charge of Libyan air operations, Canadian Lieutenant General
Brouchard was able to muster a divergent coalition around a single goal of controlling the skies over Libya and protecting civilian populations. Moreover, the coalition was able to share resources with the United States providing most of the air refueling, reconnaissance, and personnel recovery assets, while the British, French, Danes, Spanish, Emirates, and Swedish provided air interdiction and close air support.
Likewise, the Jordanians and Qataris provided airlift, the Italians, French, and Greeks hosted the air armada and Germany provided logistics and access to United States munitions. While limited to primarily air and sea lines of effort, the coalition was still able to coordinate with the Libyan rebels and achieve effects on the battlefield that led to Qadahfi's demise. General Brouchard worked within the framework he was given, balanced national interests and caveats, provided a clear commander's intent that was representative of the agreed upon strategic direction, and made the mission a success with the means he was given.
The future is difficult to predict, but a few things are certain. In our modern strategic environment with rising regional powers, economic and resource scarcity, there will always be diversity in ideas, interests, ways, means, and ends. Equally true, there will always be commonalities that bring people together to unite in a common cause. The challenge for the Coalition Force Commander is to find common ground in operations that satisfy the strategic greater good. In other words, understanding how to employ forces given national constraints and caveats, resource and operating limitations, and interoperability of the participating forces is the bread and butter of coalition operations. As coalitions of the willing form, commanders must understand the higher strategic direction and be able to shape coherent operations that generate unified action and unity of effort on the battlefield. Commanders ignore these complexities at their peril. Armed forces can ill-afford to undertake tactical level operations without understanding -or acting contrary to -strategic direction.
In both Anzio and Libya, coalition force commanders managed operations based on their understanding of the higher commander's strategic intent, and their ability to 
